All — I wonder whether “applied metaphysics” is of interest to this group. For example, here is something I set out to do in my treatment of Albert Soboul’s ontology of the French Revolution in New Contributions to the Philosophy of History. I found that all the substantive nouns that Soboul used in his account of the French Revolution could be subsumed under these categories: individuals and groups, events, organizations and institutions, mentalities, processes, conditions, patterns, and technologies. There are no entities in Soboul’s narrative that do not fit into one of these categories, and the categories themselves are reasonably independent from one another. So we might say that Soboul’s metaphysics is implicitly defined by the concepts he uses, and it can be summarized as a fairly compact historical ontology. My question to Ruth’s circle is this: is this a way of approaching the problem of metaphysics in a less aprioristic way than philosophers generally do?